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The Reinvestment Deduction:
A Modest Proposal to Reform the Taxation of
Business Income
David Hasen*
INTRODUCTION
Thoughts of fundamental tax reform are rarely far from the
minds of policy makers and tax specialists, but problems of
political choice appear to have dimmed its prospects for the
foreseeable future.1 As evidence, consider that agreement across
a wide segment of the political spectrum on reform principles has
prevailed for a number of years, but Congress lately has been
unable to advance a major reform proposal, despite efforts from
members of both major parties to do so.2 In the meantime,
narrow tax breaks of various sorts continue to proliferate in
response to lobbying efforts by organized groups, despite the
consensus among analysts that most such provisions are
ill-advised.3
It would seem, therefore, that proposals for reform in the
near term need to be relatively modest in ambition if they are to
receive consideration from policy makers. The challenge is to
advance ideas that represent policy improvements on their own
but that also tend in the direction of desirable broader-scale
* Associate Professor, Santa Clara University Law School. Thanks to participants at
Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law’s 2014 Business Tax Reform
Symposium. Unless otherwise stated, all section citations are to the U.S. Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, title 26 U.S. Code.
1 See Jonathan Weisman, The Tax Wilderness, Untamed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2014,
at BU7 (describing the “consensus” in Washington: “There will be no comprehensive tax
code overhaul this year . . . .”).
2 For the political fate of House Ways and Means Chair Rep. Dave Camp’s (R-MI)
proposal, see Brian Faler et al., How the GOP Lost Its Nerve on Tax Reform, POLITICO
(Dec. 5, 2013, 5:03 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/tax-code-gop-leaders-1006
93.html. For the political fate of Senate Finance Committee Chair Max Baucus’s (D-MT)
proposal, see Kelsey Snell, Max Baucus Tax Reform Proposal at Risk, POLITICO (July 30,
2013,
9:18
PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/07/max-baucus-tax-reform94894.html.
3 As examples, since 2000, bonus depreciation, § 179, and the bonus depreciation
allowance, § 168(k), have repeatedly been enacted with sunset provisions and renewed.
See GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31852, SECTION 179 AND BONUS
DEPRECIATION EXPENSING ALLOWANCES: CURRENT LAW, LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS IN THE
112TH C ONGRESS, AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS 4–10, (2012), available at https://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/misc/RL31852.pdf (detailing legislative histories).
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reform. In addition, and as contrasted with global reform
proposals, more-modest proposals need to be especially sensitive
to “second-best” problems because of their incremental nature. A
second-best problem arises when adoption of a reform that is
favorable when viewed in isolation makes things worse overall
because of its interaction with other features of the system that
the reform does not address.4 Because modest proposals by
definition seek to advance policy goals on a piecemeal basis, they
inevitably interact with other features of the law not subject to
change under the proposal; where these features are themselves
problematic from a policy perspective, adopting the modest
change may lead to an undesirable shift towards behavior that
the undesirable feature encourages.
This Essay is offered in the spirit of incremental reform. It
recommends enactment of a deduction to individuals for
promptly reinvested distributions received on corporate equity
and gains derived from the sale or exchange of corporate equity.
The reform is largely efficiency-oriented. For reasons explained
below, under current law, the tax on dividends and on gains
recognized from the sale or exchange of corporate equity that
would be reinvested in the absence of tax considerations is often
easily—and often likely—avoided, with the results that
economically efficient transactions do not occur and tax is not
collected. Consequently, if enacted, the proposal would remove a
highly distortionary rule that produces little tax revenue.
Moreover, though direct revenue gains would not arise, modest
increases in tax revenue may result simply from the efficiency
gains.
The proposal also moves in the direction of
more-comprehensive reform for which I have argued elsewhere.
In a recent essay, I advocated the adoption of a uniform tax on all
business income along the lines of the comprehensive business
income tax, or CBIT, that the Treasury Department proposed in
1992.5 The CBIT as originally formulated would have taxed all
business income once at the entity level, at a flat rate equal to
the top marginal rate on individuals, which then was 31%. Taxes
on distributions and on gains from the sale or exchange of
CBIT-covered entities would have been eliminated. Interest on
borrowings by CBIT-covered entities would have been
4 For a discussion of second-best problems, see generally David A. Weisbach, Line
Drawing, Doctrine, and Efficiency in the Tax Law, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1627 (1999).
5 U.S. DEP ’T OF THE TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE
TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE (1992) [hereinafter TREASURY REPORT],
available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Pages/integration-paper.
aspx#summary.
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non-deductible to payors and non-includible by payees. The
promised benefits of the original CBIT were considerable. In
addition to simplification from the repeal of subchapters S, K,
and much of C, it would have reduced or eliminated three
significant tax biases: against the corporate form; against equity
versus debt financing; and against tax-motivated earnings
distributions or retentions.6
My earlier essay advocated retention of most features of the
Treasury’s CBIT but also argued for coupling the CBIT with an
excise-tax and deduction regime on distributions and gains
realized on the disposition of CBIT interests similar to that
proposed here for corporate equity.7 The motivation for the
additional tax-and-deduction regime was to make the CBIT
workable in light of constraints absent in 1992. These include
principally the requirements that revenues increase, but that
rates on business income fall in response to concerns about
competitiveness.8 My proposal also suggested other, less
substantial, modifications to the original CBIT.9
Taking that larger reform package, or something similar to
it, as a target, the question is whether the more-modest proposal
discussed here would represent an improvement. That is, is it an
improvement taken on its own, does it move in the direction of
favorable large-scale reform, and is its implementation as a
standalone reform workable? Because I have addressed the
second question in the CBIT proposal, the discussion below
focuses on the first and third questions. Part I outlines the basics
of the proposal, Part II discusses its efficiency properties with
respect to the bias against investment in the corporate sector,

6 See id. at ch. 4. At the time, the top corporate rate exceeded the top individual rate
by 3%. Id. at 39. This disparity created a tax incentive to distribute earnings. Much more
commonly in the history of the income tax, the disparity has run in the other direction.
For all years since passage of the 16th Amendment in 1913, other than 1988 to 1993, the
top individual bracket has equaled or exceeded the top corporate bracket; for all years
other than 1988 to 1993 and 2003 to 2013, the top individual bracket has exceeded the top
corporate bracket. See SOI Tax Stats - Historical Table 23, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
http://www.irs.gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Historical-Table-23 (last updated May 1, 2013)
(individual rates); TAX POLICY CTR ., URBAN INST . & BROOKINGS INST., HISTORICAL TOP
CORPORATE TAX RATE AND BRACKET: 1909-2013, available at http://www.taxpolicy
center.org/taxfacts/content/pdf/corporate_historical_bracket.pdf (corporate rates). When
top individual rates exceed top corporate rates, the tax incentive runs in the other
direction, toward tax-motivated earnings retention.
7 David Hasen, CBIT 2.0: A Proposal to Address U.S. Business Taxation, 140 TAX
NOTES 909 (2013).
8 All recent legislative and executive branch proposals for business tax reform have
included a substantial reduction in corporate tax rates. See infra note 34.
9 These included modifications to the treatment of outbound investment income and
a lower CBIT rate. Hasen, supra note 7, at 920–23.
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and Part III considers additional behavioral effects that may
arise at the corporate level.
I. PROPOSAL
Under current law, income of regular, or “C,” corporations is
taxed at graduated rates that rise to 34% for taxable income from
$75,000 to $10 million and to 35% for income above that, with
recapture provisions to ensure that average rates and marginal
rates converge above certain thresholds.10 In addition,
distributions in respect of corporate equity made to individuals
generally are taxable at the shareholder level as net capital gains
at 15%, or at 20% for individuals having taxable income greater
than $400,000 per year ($450,000 for married filing jointly).11
The same 15 and 20% rates apply to long-term gains recognized
by individuals from the sale or exchange of stock (and other
property) that is held as a capital asset.12 By contrast, income
earned by sole proprietors, through the partnership form or by an
S corporation, generally is taxed just once, at the owner level, at
graduated rates ranging from 10% to 39.6% for individuals in the
same brackets as those subject to the 20% rate on dividends and
long-term capital gains.13 In addition, as of 2013, a 3.8% tax
applies to an individual’s “net investment income” (“NII”) to the
extent that the individual’s adjusted gross income (subject to
some modifications) exceeds $200,000 ($250,000 for married
filing jointly).14 For most taxpayers, NII includes dividend income
and income from the sale or exchange of corporate stock.15 The
tax on NII applies in addition to the regular income tax.16
The proposal would permit individual shareholders to deduct
distributions on stock held in C corporations in the year of
distribution to the extent the distributions were reinvested prior
to the due date for the return for the taxable year. The deduction
would apply for both regular income tax and NII tax purposes.
Reinvestment would not need to be in corporate equity to qualify.
The proposal would extend the same treatment to timely
reinvested long-term gains recognized on the sale or exchange of

10 § 11. In the discussion below, references to corporations and corporate equity
generally are to taxable C corporations unless stated otherwise.
11 § 1(h)(11).
12 § 1(h)(1).
13 § 1(c)–(d).
14 § 1411. Section 1411 was added by section 1402(a)(1) of Pub. L. No. 111-152. It is
effective for taxable years beginning after 2012. Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1402(a)(4), 124 Stat. 1029, 1060.
15 § 1411(c)(1)(A)(i) (dividends); § 1411(c)(1)(A)(iii) (gains from the sale or exchange
of stock).
16 § 1411(a)(1).
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stock in C corporations. In either case, no basis credit for
reinvested proceeds would be available. Instead, in the case of
reinvestment in any business entity, outside basis would not be
increased to reflect the investment of deducted amounts, and in
the case of investment in the taxpayer’s sole proprietorship, basis
in the assets of the proprietorship would be reduced. Because the
avoided income tax is charged at long-term capital rates,17 basis
reduction generally would apply to capital assets or to property
that would generate a “section 1231 gain” or “section 1231 loss”
on disposition.18 To the extent basis in those assets is insufficient,
the deduction on the original distribution or sale would be
denied.
The overall effect of the proposal is to defer both income tax
and the tax on NII on distributions and on gains from the sale or
exchange of C corporation stock until the shareholder spends the
income on consumption.19
The following examples illustrate the operation of current
law and how the proposal would alter current law.
Example 1: Individuals O1 and O2 (together, Os),
married calendar-year taxpayers filing jointly, own 100
shares of common stock in the XYZ corporation. Their
ordinary income is taxed in the 35%marginal tax
bracket. Their modified AGI for purposes of the tax on
NII exceeds the applicable threshold. On January 1 of
Year 1, XYZ distributes a dividend of $10 per share on
its common stock, or $1,000, to Os. One month after the
distribution, Os contribute $1,000 to the ABC corporation
in exchange for 100 shares of ABC common stock.
Under current law, Os include the $1,000 in gross income as
net capital gain (assuming they do not elect to treat the income
as net investment income for purposes of section 163)20 and are
taxed at a 15% rate, or $150,21 assuming they do not have

§ 1(h)(11).
§ 1231(a)(3).
Generally, consumption taxation differs from income taxation in that it does not
reach the return to waiting. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The
Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1413, 1417 (2006). If amounts are reinvested in a pass-through entity, subsequent
earnings are taxed as earned, but the expensing of the cost of the investment (to O) is
equivalent to exemption of taxation on the time-value return of the investment if the tax
rate is the same for the deduction and the inclusion. See Daniel I. Halperin & Alvin C.
Warren, Jr., Understanding Income Tax Deferral, TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2014)
(manuscript at 1–2) (on file with author).
20 See § 163(d)(4)(B). “Net investment income” for purposes of this provision is not
the same as it is for section 1411.
21 § 1(h)(1)(C).
17
18
19
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offsetting capital losses.22 Os also owe $38 of tax on the dividend
under section 1411. Os are left with $812 after taxes, for an
overall rate on the distribution of 18.8%. Therefore, the $1,000
investment in ABC requires the investment of an additional $188
of Os’ after-tax income, which is equivalent to $231.53 of pre-tax
income, assuming that income is taxed at 18.8%. Os take a
$1,000 adjusted basis in the ABC stock.
Under the proposal, Os would deduct the $1,000 investment
in ABC for purposes of both the income tax and the tax on NII.
(That is, they would take a $1,000 above-the-line deduction for
income tax purposes, and they would reduce total NII by $1,000
for NII tax purposes.) They would not receive basis credit for the
amount reinvested, regardless of whether ABC was a C
corporation or an S corporation. Similarly, if they instead
invested the $1,000 in a partnership, they would receive no basis
credit in the partnership interest thereby purchased.
The effect of the denial of outside but not inside basis is to
cause the deduction to operate as a deferral mechanism.
Specifically, the availability of basis credit at the entity level
ensures that the deduction is not offset by excess inclusions,
while the denial of basis credit at the owner level ensures the
deduction is recaptured when the taxpayer receives distributions
that are not again reinvested. Suppose, for example, that ABC is
a C corporation, and that ABC uses the $1,000 that Os contribute
to purchase tangible depreciable property having a useful life of
20 years and 0 salvage value.23 Assume ABC earns a pre-tax
return of 8% on the property, or $80 per year. In the standard
case in which full basis is available in the purchased asset, ABC
would depreciate the property by $50 per year for $30 of net
annual income. If the property were worthless after 20 years,
ABC would have no further income or loss. If basis credit were
given at the owner but not the entity level, ABC would have $80
per year of taxable income, thereby prematurely recapturing the
deduction enjoyed by Os and burdening other ABC shareholders
as well with tax on non-economic income, since the $1,000
investment is a cost of producing the income.
Instead, providing depreciable basis in ABC’s hands ensures
no excess tax at the entity level, thereby preventing other
shareholders from being over-taxed and preventing Os’ deduction
from being canceled in whole or part prior to consumption. The
§ 1222(11).
Simplifying assumptions for the computation of depreciation are used for purposes
of illustration. In practice, a mid-period convention and a declining balance method of
depreciation would apply to the property. See § 168.
22
23
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deduction is recouped only when Os’ investment is withdrawn,
either through distributions (or redemptions so treated)24 that
exceed both ABC’s earnings and profits and Os’ basis in the
stock,25 or when Os sell the ABC stock (or it is redeemed in a
transaction qualifying for sale-or-exchange treatment).26 In
either case, the gain would be capital.27
If ABC is an S corporation, the denial of outside basis again
preserves the deduction unless and until distributions exceed
that basis. Although distributions from ABC would not be eligible
for the deduction if reinvested, amounts earned through the
corporation before deducted amounts were distributed would be
taxed in the same manner as earnings on after-tax equity
contributed to the corporation. Analogous results would obtain in
the case of investment in a partnership. The reduced basis in the
ABC partnership interest (as compared to the basis funded with
after-tax dollars) would cause distributions to be treated as gains
from the sale or exchange of property sooner than if basis credit
had been provided.28
Because there is no “outside basis” in a sole proprietorship,
ensuring that the deduction operates as a deferral and not as an
exemption provision requires a different approach.
Example 2: The facts are the same as Example 1 under
the proposal, except that Os contribute $1,000 to O1’s
sole proprietorship.
In order to preserve the benefit of the deduction in this
setting, it is necessary to reduce basis in the assets of the
enterprise itself. The reduction ought properly be applied to
assets the gain on disposition of which is capital, since the
avoided tax is at capital gain rates, and a workable rule would be
to apply the deduction in proportion to the relative adjusted
bases of those assets. (A virtue of using adjusted bases rather
than fair market values is that the taxpayer should have easy
access to information about the former.) To the extent basis is
insufficient, the deduction would be denied. The effect of
reducing basis in the properties of the proprietorship is similar to
that of reducing the outside basis in the entity. Earnings
continue to be taxed as before, but depreciation deductions will
§ 302(d).
§ 301(c)(3).
§ 302(a) (sale-or-exchange treatment on certain redemptions).
§§ 1001(a), 1222(3). If the gain were not capital (because, for example, Os are
dealers in stock), the investment in ABC would not have been deductible in the first place.
28 § 731(a) (non-taxation of money distributions not in excess of partner’s basis);
§ 1368(b) (non-taxation of distributions not in excess of shareholder’s basis in S
corporation).
24
25
26
27
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be less, and gains on the sale or exchange of business property
will be subject to greater tax than if no deduction had been taken
on the initial distribution from XYZ.
Equivalently, the proposal converts the nominal income tax
on earnings distributions to a consumption tax under certain
restrictive assumptions. For reasons stated in the earlier
proposal for a modified CBIT, there are ample grounds to support
the introduction of explicit consumption taxation of distributions
into what is nominally an income tax regime, chief among them
that consumption tax treatment already applies to many such
gains in practice for the very reasons that motivate the
proposal.29 For the reasons developed in that discussion and
alluded to above, C corporation earnings often are not cashed out
by tax-sensitive investors until the investor is ready to spend
them on consumption. To that extent, the question is how
removal of the tax on what is in substance investment
reallocations (i.e., reinvestment of dividend distributions) affects
reallocations rather than how it affects revenues or fairness. The
effect of removing the tax on reallocations is the subject of the
next section.
II. EFFICIENCY IMPLICATIONS
Intuitively, it is not hard to see why a dividend tax reduction
ought to lead to an efficiency gain. The general view is that
current law skews investment away from the C corporation form
because of the “double tax” on corporate equity.30 Specifically,
because earnings of C corporations are taxed to the corporation
as earned and again on distribution as dividends, they may be
subject to an overall effective income tax rate of approximately
45% for most investors, and 48% for high-bracket investors.31
These rates apply whether distributed earnings are drawn down
for consumption or reinvested. Earnings of other business forms
are taxed to owners once at a maximum rate of 35% for most
taxpayers and 39.6% for high-bracket individuals.32 The
corporate-level behavioral effects of the high rate on dividends
are not entirely clear (they are discussed in the next section), but
the efficiency costs at the shareholder level are more readily
identifiable. To the extent shareholders are unable to avoid the
Hasen, supra note 7, at 914–16.
See, e.g., George R. Zodrow, On the “Traditional” and “New” Views of Dividend
Taxation, 44 NAT ’L TAX J. 497, 497 (1991).
31 § 11 (tax on corporations); § 1(h)(11) (treating qualified dividends as net capital
gain); § 1(h)(1) (imposing a maximum tax on net capital gain of 15% for taxpayers in the
35% bracket or below on their ordinary income and 20% for taxpayers in the 39.6%
ordinary income bracket).
32 § 1(a)–(d).
29
30
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tax on corporate earnings, the after-tax price of equity increases
relative to that of alternatives, inducing an exodus of investment
from the corporate equity sector to other sectors, including debt
and pass-through enterprises. The drop in corporate sector equity
investment raises the return to capital that remains there, but
the overall effect is a macro-level misallocation of equity capital
between the corporate and non-corporate sectors.33
If the law otherwise remains unchanged, the proposal would
ameliorate the bias against the corporate form by reducing the ex
ante tax cost of investing in the corporate sector. The result
would be an unambiguous reduction in the tax disincentive to
invest in corporations, since the consumption tax benefit with
respect to the distribution tax that is already available (at the
efficiency cost of retaining earnings that otherwise would be
distributed or holding stock that would otherwise be sold) would
simply be extended to allow earnings reallocations that, on a
pre-tax basis, are more desirable than leaving earnings in the
corporation where they arise or than leaving the stock in the
hands of the shareholder who owned the stock during the period
that the corporation derived the earnings. Further, because the
benefit is only a timing one, the proposal runs the risk of
inefficiently biasing investment in favor of corporate equity
(again assuming no other change in the law) only if three
unlikely conditions all hold: interest rates become very high;
investors perceive a very substantial pre-tax advantage in being
able to reallocate earnings to other vehicles over leaving earnings
in the corporation where they arise or continuing to hold stock;
and the marginal investor is in a bracket above the maximum
35% bracket for corporations. (For purposes of the last
requirement, the tax on NII should be added to the shareholder’s
income tax bracket.) Under these circumstances, the slightly
lower rate on corporate equity as compared to other forms of
investment for high-tax investors, together with the extension of
that tax rate to reallocated profits, might create a tax bias in
favor of investment in the corporate form. Note, however, that in
particular the second condition is unlikely to hold. It is the fact
that keeping profits in the corporation where they arise is a close
substitute for reallocating them to other investments that creates
the deadweight loss that the proposal seeks to reduce in the first
place.

33 For a general discussion of this phenomenon, see R. Glenn Hubbard, Corporate
Tax Integration: A View from the Treasury Department, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 115, 118–19
(1993). See also TREASURY REPORT, supra note 5, ch. 13.
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Wholly apart from the consequences of adopting the
proposal, the magnitude of the tax bias against the corporate
form would change, and its sign possibly even reverse, if
Congress succeeds in materially reducing the top corporate rate,
especially in light of the tax on NII.34 By lowering the rate on
corporate investment and leaving the rates on pass-through
entities and sole proprietorships unchanged, an advantage to
investment in corporations would arise to the extent the ultimate
tax on corporate distributions (or gains on the sale of corporate
stock) does not outweigh the benefits of a lower rate on corporate
income compared to the income of more highly-taxed investors in
pass-through entities and sole proprietorships. The proposal here
would increase that advantage to some extent, because it lowers
the effective rate on returns from corporate equity. In general,
the trade-off becomes taxation at a lower entity rate for corporate
equity in exchange for an ultimate excise tax on distribution for
consumption rather than on distribution simply. The longer the
time between the investment and consumption and the greater
the discount rate, the lower the real effective tax on corporate
equity that would otherwise be distributed and reallocated.
Again, however, in light of the availability of self-help in the
form of earnings retention (especially where distributions are
sensitive to expected shareholder uses of the distributions), it
does not seem that any additional incentive to invest in the
corporate form or revenue loss from adoption of the proposal will
be substantial, while any efficiency benefits with respect to
already-invested amounts would persist. In short, if Congress
lowers the maximum corporate rate, the tax bias in favor of
corporate equity will result from that rate reduction, not from the
proposal. Even if corporate investment becomes tax-favored, it
would still be welfare-improving to provide the deduction if
distribution behavior is sensitive to the tax on distributions, a
topic briefly discussed in the next section.
III. ADDITIONAL BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS
The preceding section described the most easily predicted
effect of adoption of the proposal, but other adjustments are
34 Proposals to reduce corporate rates enjoy theoretical support across a wide
segment of the political spectrum. See, e.g., MAX BAUCUS, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON F IN.,
SUMMARY OF STAFF DISCUSSION DRAFT: INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TAX REFORM 2 (2013),
available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Chairman's%20Staff%20Inter
national%20Discussion%20Draft%20Summary.pdf (advocating “significantly lower
corporate tax rates”); HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 113TH CONG., DISCUSSION DRAFT
ON TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014 (2014), available at http://waysandmeans.house.gov/up
loadedfiles/statutory_text_tax_reform_act_of_2014_discussion_draft_022614.pdf (reducing
the corporate tax rate to 25% under proposed section 3001 of the 2014 Act).
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likely to occur as well. In general, the proposal potentially will
have an impact across two additional behavioral margins: the
corporation’s decision to distribute earnings or not, and the
corporation’s decision to finance marginal investment with equity
or not. Even if the overall efficiency consequences of adopting the
proposal would be positive for the reasons discussed above, the
question remains what the new steady state will be along all
margins once all adjustments occur. For example, if the dividend
tax rate does not markedly affect dividend policy, it is not clear
that the proposal will reduce inefficient earnings retention (if
corporations in fact retain earnings that should be distributed).
Similarly, if managers finance marginal projects with retained
earnings, the proposal may have little effect on levels of equity
finance. More generally, the answer to whether adoption of the
proposal would result in an increase in equity finance, in
distributions, or in both, depends not only on the benefits from a
reduction in the tax burden of owning corporate equity, but also
on managerial incentives. Depending upon the role that
dividends and equity issuances play in corporate finance and the
alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ interests, the
corporate-level behavioral effects of a dividend tax reduction can
differ.
A. Theories of Managerial Behavior
Currently, four main views vie for explanatory power over
managerial behavior;35 the consequences of adoption of the
proposal depend in some measure on the extent to which each
theory accounts for managerial behavior. This subsection briefly
outlines these views and the consequences of adoption of the
proposal under each of them. Subsection B then reviews some
recent empirical findings.
Until the 1980s, economists generally held what has since
been termed the “old” or “traditional” view of managerial
behavior. The old view assumes that managers seek to maximize
shareholder value and that corporations finance new projects
with either debt or equity.36 Because dividend taxes have the
effect of “double-taxing” corporate earnings, managers incline
toward debt finance, which permits a deduction to the firm for

35 Alan Auerbach & Kevin Hassett, Dividend Taxes and Firm Valuation: New
Evidence 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11959, 2006). Another
theory, the “tax irrelevance” view, posits that the marginal investor is tax -indifferent and
therefore that dividend taxes are entirely irrelevant to managerial finance decisions; the
evidence does not appear to support this view. Id.
36 Zodrow, supra note 30, at 497.

Do Not Delete

60

9/27/2014 10:00 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 18:1

interest payments,37 and away from equity finance, which
provides no deductions for dividends paid. To the extent the old
view holds, a dividend reinvestment deduction enhances the
attractiveness of equity finance to managers because the greater
after-tax value to shareholders of dividend payments reduces the
cost of equity to the corporation.38 Similarly, the overall increase
in corporate equity implies greater total dividend payouts.39
Further, where managers know that shareholders expect to
reallocate distributions rather than to spend them on
consumption, one would expect an increase in distributions.
A second view, and the primary competitor to the old view, is
the “new” view. In its basic formulation, it likewise posits that
managers seek to maximize shareholder value, but it assumes
that corporations finance marginal investments with retained
earnings rather than with new equity or debt issues.40 In this
setting, dividend taxes are thought to have no effect on the
marginal finance decision or the size of dividend distributions,
though they do affect the price of corporate equity.41 When
retained earnings are available to finance new projects, a firm
will use those earnings for the project, and the dividend tax
operates similarly to an excise tax.42 Because the present value of
such a tax is constant, changes in the dividend tax rate have no
differential impact on the timing of the dividend payment—it has
the same present value no matter when paid.43 Yet even if the
new view better explains manager behavior than does the old
view, the proposal should result in an increase in distributions,
because the excise tax effect, which is to say deferral, continues
even on distributed earnings that are reinvested, assuming
managers seek to maximize shareholder value.44 To some extent,
37 Hans-Werner Sinn, Taxation and the Cost of Capital: The “Old” View, the “New”
View, and Another View, in 5 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 25, 27–29 (David Bradford
ed., 1991).
38 Roger Gordon & Martin Dietz, Dividends and Taxes 3–4, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 12292, 2006).
39 Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, An Agency Theory of Dividend Taxation 1 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13538, 2007).
40 Zodrow, supra note 30, at 497.
41 Auerbach & Hassett, supra note 35, at 1; Zodrow, supra note 30, at 497–500.
42 Zodrow, supra note 30, at 500. See also Seppo Kari et al., The Impact of Dividend
Taxation on Dividends and Investment: New Evidence Based on a Natural Experiment 7
(CESifo, Working Paper No. 2756, 2009), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/
ceswps/_2756.html.
43 Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, Dividend and Corporate Taxation in an Agency
Model of the Firm, 2 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 1, 4–5 (2010).
44 The cost to the firm of the dividend tax is constant. Id. But the cost to
shareholders is not under current law, because the after-tax proceeds available for
investment are reduced by the dividend tax. Because the proposal extends consumption
tax treatment to reinvested distributions, shareholders continue to derive a benefit from
deferring consumption of the distribution.
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however, this analysis assumes that distribution policy is
informed by managers’ knowledge that distributions are likely to
be reinvested rather than spent on consumption. Equivalently
(under the assumption of alignment of shareholder and
management incentives), it assumes that shareholders dictate
the timing of distributions.
A third view posits that dividend payouts serve a signaling
function in the public corporation setting.45 They enable
managers to demonstrate that the firm is “healthy.”46 Under the
signaling view, a cut in the dividend price generally reduces the
cost of the (costly) signal and so should result in an increase in
the size, if not the number, of dividend payouts. However, under
at least one formulation of the signaling model, the dividend tax
actually increases efficiency, at least for dividend-paying firms
not engaged in share repurchase programs.47 For these firms, the
increase in dividends could actually result in an efficiency cost.
Finally, a more recent theory posits that principal-agent
problems afflict managerial decision making where ownership
and control of the corporation are separate. Because owners
cannot effectively monitor managers, managers pursue policies
inconsistent with those that maximize shareholder value.48
Under this view, managers use retained earnings to fund “perks
and pet projects” even though shareholders would prefer that the
earnings be distributed or spent on a better investment.49 The
effect of the reinvestment deduction on managers’ behavior in
this setting depends on the amount of earnings on hand, though
in the model developed by economists Raj Chetty and Emmanuel
Saez, a reduction in dividend taxation would be associated with
an unambiguous welfare improvement whether or not earnings
are available. Under their model, if dividend taxes are lowered,
cash-rich firms that otherwise would use retained earnings to
pursue unproductive pet projects face pressure to distribute the
earnings, and cash-poor firms that otherwise would not finance a
marginal meritorious project do so with additional equity
issues.50 The first of these effects relates to the question of
whether to retain or distribute earnings, while the second relates
to the question of whether to finance with equity or not. Hence
the productivity effect of a reduction in the dividend tax on the
marginal finance decision appears to be modest but
45
46
47
48
49
50

Id. at 2.
Gordon & Dietz, supra note 38, at 2.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28–29.
Chetty & Saez, supra note 43, at 2.
Id. at 15.
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unambiguously positive under the agency view: A dividend tax
reduction increases the incentive of cash-rich firms to distribute
earnings that should be distributed and reduces the disincentive
of cash-poor firms to finance with equity because of the tax
disadvantage as compared with debt.
B. Empirical Findings
Evidence regarding the explanatory power of the theories is
somewhat mixed, but it appears that the most robust theory is
the agency model, followed by the traditional model. François
Gourio and Jianjun Miao, summarizing literature on the 2003
dividend tax cut, report substantial increases in dividend payouts
following that cut, which lowered top dividend rates from 35 to
15%.51 Chetty and Saez report similar findings regarding the
2003 dividend tax cut, noting in addition that the response was
rapid and larger where executives were substantial shareholders
or where substantial shareholders served on the board of
directors.52 These phenomena are mostly consistent with the
predictions of the traditional model and more consistent with
their agency model, but less so with the other models.53 Gourio
and Miao’s model also predicts substantial efficiency gains from
reduction of the barrier to efficient allocation of investment that
result from the rate cut.54 Roger Gordon and Martin Dietz,
reviewing findings dating back to 1980, similarly conclude that
the agency model best fits the evidence.55 Further, under any of
these theories except the signaling model, a reduction in dividend
taxes has no efficiency losses at the managerial level; under the
traditional and agency views, it results in unambiguous
efficiency gains at the managerial level.
These studies focused on the 2003 dividend tax reduction (as
well as, in some cases, on other tax law changes), a less targeted
but larger tax benefit than that proposed here. It was less
targeted in that it applied without regard to the purpose for
which dividends were spent; it was larger in that it represented a
dramatic rate reduction, at least in nominal terms, when
measured against prior law. (The extent to which it represented
a real rate reduction depends on the availability under prior law
51 See generally François Gourio & Jianjun Miao, Firm Heterogeneity and the
Long-Run Effect of Dividend Tax Reform, 2 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECONOMICS 131 (2010)
(summarizing recent studies).
52 Chetty & Saez, supra note 43, at 2.
53 See James Poterba, Taxation and Corporate Payout Policy, 94 AM. ECON. REV.
171, 174–75 (2004) (predicting a high response to the 2003 reduction in taxes on
dividends).
54 Gourio & Miao, supra note 51, at 133.
55 Gordon & Dietz, supra note 38, at 28–29.

Do Not Delete

2014]

9/27/2014 10:00 PM

The Reinvestment Deduction

63

of better-taxed substitutes for distributions, of which two are of
significance: share repurchases qualifying for sale-or-exchange
treatment,56 and simple sales of stock to third parties.) These two
features of the comparison between the 2003 change and the
reinvestment deduction proposal cut in opposite directions. Other
things equal, a larger tax reduction should result in a larger
behavioral response, because of the larger avoided tax cost
associated with the more favored activity when measured against
prior law. On the other hand, the deduction reinvestment
proposal targets more elastic behavior than did the 2003 Act.
Distributions earmarked for consumption (to the extent
shareholders control or effectively inform distribution policy) are
inherently less elastic to dividend tax rates than are
distributions that are expected to be reinvested, because
consumption is not a close substitute for continued investment.
By contrast, the effect of reinvesting distributed earnings is
simply a reallocation of the shareholder’s capital; leaving the
earnings in the corporation where they arise is a relatively close
substitute for that activity, which means that in many cases
taxing earnings on distribution that otherwise would be
reinvested will result in non-distribution of the earnings (again,
assuming distribution policy is affected by the shareholders’
expected use of the distribution proceeds). In short, whatever the
pre-tax difference between distribution of earnings for the
purpose of reallocation on one hand, and non-distribution of
earnings on the other, it is almost certainly too small to warrant
the payment of a 15 or 20% tax for the privilege. The dividend
reinvestment proposal, because it provides a benefit only for
deferred consumption, targets tax-motivated earnings retention
when the alternative would be reinvestment.
The implication is that the deduction proposal is likely to
result in a more modest behavioral change than that of the 2003
Act at both the shareholder and the corporate levels, but in a
more dramatic welfare improvement when measured in terms of
the ratio of avoided deadweight loss to reductions in tax
revenues. In short, the proposal appears to offer a fairly
unambiguous policy improvement.
CONCLUSION
The object of the proposal discussed here is twofold. First, it
is to identify a low-cost reform measure that is relatively modest
in ambition, clearly favorable in efficiency terms, and therefore
more likely than a comprehensive reform proposal to meet with
56

§ 302(a)–(b).
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serious consideration from policy makers in the present
environment. Second, it is to point in the direction of larger-scale
reform that would bring with it much more substantial benefits,
including dramatic simplification and enhanced efficiency, if and
when global reform becomes a viable policy option. Enactment of
the reinvestment deduction would accomplish these goals by
eliminating substantial efficiency losses at little revenue cost in
static terms (and possibly by generating tax revenue increases in
dynamic terms) and establishing a precedent for a simplified,
mixed income-consumption tax regime applicable to all business
income.

